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SHOUTING "FIRE!" IN A THEATER AND VILIFYING
CORN DEALERS'
VINCENT BLASI*

I. INTRODUCTION
Five years ago, Fred Schauer published an article with the intriguing
title: "Do Cases Make Bad Law?" 2 Playing off Holmes' observation that
"[g]reat cases like hard cases make bad law,"3 Schauer explored the
possibility, as he put it, that "it is not just great cases and hard cases that
make bad law, but simply the deciding of cases that makes bad law.'A His
concern, confirmed and deepened by his characteristically balanced
inquiry, was that general principles forged in the resolution of specific
legal disputes can suffer by virtue of that provenance.5 Because such
principles by definition are meant to carry some measure of authority in the
resolution of future disputes, a principle invoked to justify a particular case
outcome needs to be formulated with an accurate understanding of what
kinds of cases, in what proportions, are likely to arise in the future that
would be subject to the principle that is employed to decide the case at
hand.6 And that understanding, Schauer maintained, more often than not
will be distorted by various cognitive biases that derive from the partial

Copyright C 2011, Vincent Blasi.
. Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School. This is a revised
version of the John E. Sullivan Lecture, delivered at the Capital University Law School on
April 8, 2010. Having met Professor Sullivan at the 2009 Sullivan Lecture and having
heard in the tributes of his former students about his high standards and loving devotion to
his craft, I was honored to be invited to give the Sullivan Lecture. I am indebted to Kent
Greenawalt, Joseph Raz, and especially Frederick Schauer for their constructive criticisms
and helpful suggestions, and to Brent Ferguson and Lisa Sokolowski for superb research
assistance. I also want to thank my former student, Professor James Beattie of the Capital
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1 See Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John
Stuart Mill's On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REv. 571 (2011), for a response to this article.
2 Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Ci. L. REV. 883, 883 (2006).
N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
4 Schauer, supra note 2, at 885.

See id. at 884-85.
6Id. at 893-94.
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and often unrepresentative information generated by the instant litigation7
and by the pull of equities specific to the case before the court.'
My topic in this lecture is not real cases, with their potential to distort
the choice of principles, but rather hypothetical cases. Such figments of
the human imagination no doubt spring from and perpetuate cognitive
biases of their own,9 biases that could lead to the adoption of principles
that are less efficacious than others that might have been adopted but for
the distortions introduced by thinking about the hypothetical case. On the
other hand, as Professor Schauer has observed, hypothetical cases may
exert a less powerful distorting influence than real cases precisely because
their lack of flesh-and-blood, on-the-ground facts and parties gives them
less salience, and on that account less gravitational pull in the process of
principle selection.'o One might even speculate that because hypothetical
cases are invented for their heuristic efficacy, they can provide a
countervailing salience that might diminish the distorting effects of the
information and equities presented by the case at hand.
This problem of the distorting effect of the use of hypothetical cases in
legal reasoning is potentially a rich subject. It is, however, a line of
inquiry that I am neither inclined nor well equipped to pursue. My interest
in hypothetical cases lies elsewhere. I will examine what are probably the
two most famous hypothetical cases about free speech ever devised, not to
assess their possible distorting influence but rather to determine what they
are supposed to prove.
No one familiar with the history of Anglo-American thought about the
freedom of speech will be surprised by my choice of examples. The first is
John Stuart Mill's statement in On Liberty that the opinion that corn
dealers are starvers of the poor "may justly incur punishment when
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn
dealer."" The second is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' dictum that the
First Amendment "would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic."l2 Mill and Holmes not only produced
philosophical arguments that have figured prominently in modem analysis
of the freedom of speech, they also devised limiting cases that have proved
Id. at 894-99.
Id. at 899-901.
See id. at 894-96.
'0 Id. at 913.
1 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 121 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
12Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
8
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through the years to have unexpected resonance. A critical comparison of
these famous starting points for marking the limits of free speech is in
order.' 3
II. VILIFYING THE CORN DEALER
Few political issues in Mill's time generated so much class warfare and
political antipathy as the Corn Laws, protective tariffs that exerted upward
pressure on the price of bread to the benefit of farmers and agricultural
laborers and the dismay of the urban poor mired in their Malthusian
demographics.14 In Victorian England, to express an opinion regarding the
character or intentions of corn dealers was to touch nerves. 5
In On Liberty, Mill defends the principle that "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."' He asserts
that this principle entails "absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all
subjects."' 7 He then observes, enigmatically:
The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may
seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to
that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns
other people; but, being almost of as much importance as
the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the
same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.' 8
13 Surprisingly, despite the dominant role that Mill and Holmes have played in the
history of thought about the freedom of speech, until last year there existed in the scholarly
literature no detailed comparison of their theories. That omission is corrected by Irene M.
Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart Mill's and Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes's FreeSpeech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35 (2010).
14 See MARK OVERTON, AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AGRARIAN ECONOMY 1500-1850, at 145-46 (1996); Cheryl
Schonhardt-Bailey, Introduction to FREE TRADE: THE REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS, at xviiixxvii (1996); J. R. Wordie, Perceptions and Reality: The Effects of the Corn Laws and
Their Repeal in England, 1815-1906, in AGRICULTURE AND POLITICS IN ENGLAND, 1815-

1939, at 33, 33-35 (J. R. Wordie ed., 2000). For more information on the eighteenth
century background to this chronic and often violent conflict over the price of bread, see E.

P. Thompson, The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, 50
PAST & PRESENT 76, 94-107 (1971).
1s See sources cited supra note 14.
16 MILL, supra note 11, at 80.

'Id. at 82.
8
Id. at 82-83.
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This juxtaposition of propositions has puzzled interpreters ever since
Mill's essay achieved almost instant canonical status. 9 Is he saying that a
provocative or disgusting opinion can cause harm when expressed publicly
but that such an act of expression cannot be regulated because it is
"practically inseparable" from the act of silently holding the opinion?
Why isn't the difference in the harm-causing potential that follows from
the expression of the opinion enough to distinguish the two acts? Or is
Mill's belief that although the expression of a disturbing opinion "concerns
other people" who are outraged or threatened by it, that effect does not
amount to the type of "harm to others" that limits his liberty principle? It
is all very confusing.
Hence the profound expositional importance of his corn dealer
example:
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions.
On the contrary, even opinions lose their immunity, when
the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as
to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some
mischievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers
of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but
may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an
excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer,
or when handed about among the same mob in the form of
Acts of whatever kind, which, without
a placard.
justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the
more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled
by the unfavorable sentiments, and, when needful, by the
active interference of mankind.20
To understand the line that Mill has in mind, we need to appreciate
why he thinks that the circulation through the press of an accusation
vilifying corn dealers "ought to be unmolested," and also why he believes
that the very same opinion can be the subject of punishment when
19 See

JOHN SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL 369-75 (1989) [hereinafter SKORUPSKI,

JOHN STUART MILL], for the best explanation of these tensions that I have discovered. See
also JOHN SKORUPSKI, WHY READ MILL TODAY? 56-61 (2006); C. L. TEN, MILL ON
LIBERTY 132-36 (1980); R. H. Hutton, Mill on Liberty, 8 NAT'L REV. 393 (1859), reprinted
in LIBERTY: CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES TO JOHN STUART MILL 81, 106-09 (Andrew Pyle
ed., 1994).
20 MILL, supra note 11, at 121.
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delivered orally or via a placard "to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn dealer." Is the difference simply the presumed higher
probability of an attack on the corn dealer when members of the excited
mob receive the opinion in person at a place where action can be
commenced immediately? That assessment of comparative probabilities is
highly plausible, but in distinguishing the two cases, Mill argues as if he
perceives a difference in principle, not just in degree of probabilities.
Furthermore, depending on the extent of circulation, power of the prose,
and reputation of the writer in the relevant quarters, an opinion published
in the press could have considerable harm-causing potential by virtue of its
capacity to appeal to large numbers of persons who may harbor grievances
against different corn dealers. That being the case, why doesn't Mill
qualify his assertion that the act of circulating such an incendiary opinion
through the press is never punishable? And why, if all that is involved is
an empirical estimate of probabilities, does Mill employ the concept of a
"positive instigation to some mischievous act"? Why not "causal
connection to some mischievous act" or some other formulation less
focused on the moral agency of the speaker? "Positive instigation" appears
to bring into play the character of the speech, the intentions of the speaker,
perhaps the manner by which the communication induces listeners to act,
and possibly the vulnerabilities of audience members. In other words, Mill
seems to distinguish the two situations qualitatively, not just by means of a
quantitative difference in the probability of harm.
One might challenge this reading by pointing to Mill's use of the term
"instigation" at an earlier point in On Liberty when he is discussing the
advocacy of tyrannicide. There he says: "I hold that the instigation to
[tyrannicide], in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment,
but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a probable connection can
be established between the act and the instigation." 2 1 It is true that in this
passage Mill takes probability into account, but he does so not to determine
what counts as an "instigation," much less a "positive instigation," but
rather to establish what he considers to be the requisite connection, if
punishment of the speaker is to be justified, between an instigation and the
harmful event that it may be thought to have caused. He thus treats
instigation and causation as independent variables, both necessary, such
that causation cannot define instigation. It is unlikely that Mill thinks that
an overt act of tyrannicide that has some "probable connection" to any kind
of prior speech advocating or justifying tyrannicide is a sufficient ground,
21 Id

at 87.
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without more, for punishing the speaker. That would hardly comport with
his call three sentences earlier for "the fullest liberty of professing and
discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, no matter how
immoral it may be considered." 22 The correct interpretation of the
tyrannicide passage, I believe, is that proposed by Geoffrey Marshall:
What he presumably ought to be saying is that if an act is
mischievous or damaging to others or to society, society
may properly make it criminal and suppress such speech
acts as are so closely connected with the commission of
the act as to be part of it or be counted as attempts to do
the act; but that something to be called discussion,
advocacy, debate, or expression of opinion about its
desirability, can never be deemed to be part of a
23
mischievous action in this sense.
Mill's key distinction is between, as Marshall puts it, "discussion,
advocacy, debate, or expression of opinion" and "positive instigation."
That is a conceptual or qualitative distinction that goes to the nature and
social value of the speaker's activity, which is exactly and exclusively
what Mill talks about in the long, justly renowned chapter that is bracketed
by the tyrannicide and corn dealer examples.24
Another qualitative difference that might lie at the heart of Mill's
distinction is the difference between the total prohibition of an idea and a
regulation that is partial in the sense that its application is contingent on the
particular circumstances of the act of dissemination-the timing, the place,
the means and manner of expression, the audience addressed-such that
other opportunities are left open for the idea to be circulated. The right to
express opinions is valuable to Mill primarily because it serves the
freedom of thought. The freedom to express an opinion can be happiness
generating in other ways related to self-assertion and the exercise of
influence over others, and those satisfactions count in his utilitarian
calculus. But the extraordinary protection Mill accords the freedom to
express opinions gains it special priority, its power to trump the predictable
and occasionally severe harms that flow from many ideas, from the
transcendent importance he attaches to the human capacity to exercise
independent judgment. That capacity is compromised far more by a
22Id.
23

at 86.

GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 157 (1971).

24 MILL,

supra note 11, at 86-120.
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comprehensive ban on circulating an idea than by a partial regulation
limited to particular circumstances. And in the mass society of Mill's day,
to prohibit the dissemination of an opinion through the press was,
practically speaking, entirely to prohibit its general circulation.2
In explaining the premises on which he builds his argument, Mill says:
"I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must
be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man
as a progressive being." 26 Those permanent interests related to progress
depend, Mill firmly believes, on widespread free thought and on the
presence throughout the society of persons with the strength of character to
27
be bold in their inquiries, unshackled by custom and convention. Were
majorities, "or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the
majority,"2 8 to possess the authority to banish ideas they detest or fear, the
freedom of thought and strength of character that Mill considers to be the
keys to progressive well-being would be imperiled. However, the
"permanent interests of man as a progressive being" do not require that
speakers have an unqualified right to convey their opinions at the times, in
the places, by the methods, and to the audiences of their choice. Thus, the
speaker who addresses the excited mob before the corn dealer's home can
be punished.
A close reader of Mill might object to this explanation for his corn
dealer example by calling attention to the following passage in On Liberty:
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to
suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which
pretends that human beings have no business with each
other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern
themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one
another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of
any diminution, there is need of a great increase of
disinterested exertion to promote the good of others....
Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the
better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the
former and avoid the latter.... Considerations to aid [a
25 See HANNAH BARKER, NEWSPAPERS, POLITICS AND ENGLISH SOCIETY 1695-1855, at

4-5, 26-28, 225 (2000); 1 STEPHEN Koss, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE POLITICAL PRESS IN
BRITAIN 24 (1981).
26
MILL, supra note 11, at 81.
27 Id. at 122-25; see Ten Cate, supra note 13, at 50-52.
28 MILL, supra note 11, at 75.
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person's] judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will,
may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by others;
[even though] he himself is the final judge.2 9
Mill clearly believes that social interaction, especially morally and
intellectually contentious interaction, is crucial to the freedom of thought.
Thus, he can hardly be indifferent to any regulation of speech that reduces
the incidence, or even the intensity, of exchanges of opinions. "[A] high
general average of energy" is Mill's prescription for maximizing
Regulations of speech that are contingent on
progressive utility. 30
circumstances may not banish ideas entirely, but they certainly can
diminish disputational energy. Consistent with Mill's prioritization of the
freedom of thought, such "partial" regulations of speech cannot be
considered to be inconsequential or only moderately threatening to his
conception of social well-being.
Surely this point is well taken. It only proves, however, that Mill's
argument in On Liberty calls for additional protection for the liberty to
communicate beyond what is entailed by granting speakers absolute
immunity from context-independent general prohibitions of disfavored
ideas. I read Mill to favor both an absolute freedom from such contextindependent general prohibitions of ideas and also a robust, albeit
qualified, freedom from regulations of speech that turn on the particular
circumstances of dissemination. This latter, qualified freedom is subject,
in Mill's scheme, to his Harm Principle: a sufficient showing of predicted
harm can justify regulations of speech that do not, because they turn on
context, amount to the total prohibition of the circulation of an opinion or
observation. Even when his Harm Principle is activated, however, for the
regulation of speech to be legitimate the predicted harm to society of the
speech in question must outweigh its predicted or posited social benefit.3 '
29

1d. at 140.
Id. at 125.
31 See infra text accompanying note 40. It is instructive to contrast the fairly robust
implications of Mill's argument for the liberty of thought and discussion regarding partial,
context-specific regulations of speech with the weaker implications of a different kind of
argument, grounded in personal autonomy rather than progressive utilitarianism, developed
by one of his most important successors as a theorist of liberalism. See Joseph Raz, Free
Expression and PersonalIdentification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STuD. 305, 313-14 (1991),
reprintedin ETICS INTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN 131, 141-42 (1994).
30

This argument [that free speech enables autonomy by publicly
validating diverse ways of life] shows freedom of expression to be a
(continued)
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Some knowledgeable commentators on Mill assume that he means his
Harm Principle to govern all restrictions on the dissemination of ideas, not
just partial regulations that are context-dependent.32 But that reading of
Mill is difficult to square with his assertion that even though it "belongs to
that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people," the
"liberty of expressing and publishing opinions" rests "in great part on the
same reasons" and "is practically inseparable from" the "absolute freedom
of opinion and sentiment on all subjects" and does not "fall under a
different principle." 3 Mill's failure to mention his Harm Principle in
delineating the liberty of expressing opinions is a particularly telling
omission in that in the very same paragraph he goes on to describe two
additional liberties, the "liberty of tastes and pursuits" and the liberty "of
combination among individuals," each of which he explicitly limits by the
caveat "so long as what we do does not harm [our fellow creatures]." 3 4
The claim that the liberty of expressing opinions is qualified by the Harm
Principle is also hard to square with the stunning fact that in all of Chapter
public good, a constitutive element of a public culture [that makes
individual autonomy possible]. It points to a strong positive case for
free expression. It points to the importance not only of the absence of
censorship but of providing access to the means of public expression to
those who portray various ways of life, and express different points of
view. At the same time the argument supports only a weak, overridable
right. Like all public-good arguments, it is weak on setting boundaries.
No major difficulty arises if one allows, say private television stations
to deny access to certain views, so long as those views can find other
avenues of expression. No major problem arises from restricting the
areas in towns in which demonstrations can be held, so long as the areas
available provide for a reasonably effective way of expressing views
and displaying the intensity with which they are felt.
Id. I believe that Mill's emphasis on collective well-being via progress in truth-seeking,
and especially the role that a high general level of disputational and inquisitive energy
throughout the society plays in serving that good, implies stronger rights against timemanner-place regulations of speech than does Raz's theory.
32 See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Mill's Liberal Principles and Freedom of Expression, in
MILL'S ON LIBERTY: A CRITICAL GuIDE 40, 52-57 (C. L. Ten ed., 2008); David Dyzenhaus,
John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography, in MILL'S ON LIBERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS
31, 41-48 (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1997); Jonathan Riley, Racism, Blasphemy, and Free
Speech, in MILL'S ON LIBERTY: A CRITICAL GUIDE 62, 62-66 (C. L. Ten ed., 2008); Jeremy
Waldron, LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 117-19, 131-33 (1993).
3 MILL, supra note 11, at 82-83.
34

Id. at 83 .
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Two of On Liberty, the chapter entitled "Of the Liberty of Thought and
Discussion," his longest and most thoroughly elaborated chapter, Mill
never once considers the harms that speech might cause, only the
multifarious benefits.
Immediately following Chapter Two, of course, Mill does indeed
consider the harm that various exercises of liberty can cause. This is where
his corn dealer passage appears. 35 This is where he says that "[n]o one
pretends that actions should be as free as opinions" and that "even opinions
lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed
are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some
mischievous act."3 After offering his two distinguishable instances of
vilifying corn dealers-in the press and to an excited mob before the house
of a corn dealer-Mill restates the general principle that these examples
are meant to illustrate:
Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause,
do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases
absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable
sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference
of mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far
limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other
people.
It is noteworthy that the example Mill offers of the expression of an
opinion that he asserts is governed by the Harm Principle is delineated by
the circumstances surrounding the act of dissemination and is characterized
by loaded terms ("positive instigation," "nuisance") that serve to
differentiate the activity from the processes of "thought and discussion"
that are the subject of Chapter Two, where the Harm Principle never
appears. Furthermore, Mill is careful in stating his general principle to say,
not that acts that do harm to others may be regulated, but rather only acts
Deliberately
"which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others."3
instigating harm or making oneself a nuisance to others does not qualify as
"justifiable cause" in Mill's regime of progressive utilitarianism. But
contributing to the truth-seeking activities he canvasses in Chapter Twointroducing new ideas, defending unpopular old ideas, separating the wheat
35

1 d. at 121.

36 id.

3

Id.

38Id

(emphasis added).
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from the chaff of public discussion, propounding errors that serve as
productive foils-certainly does.
To counter this textual evidence that Mill does not intend his Harm
Principle to limit all the liberties he discusses, and specifically not the
liberty of thought and discussion, one might observe that Mill offers a
rather unitary description of his project in On Liberty: "The object of this
Essay is to assert one very simple principle . ...

That principle is, . . . the

only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." 39
But just because harm prevention is the only justification for limiting
liberty does not imply that it is invariably a sufficient reason to limit each
of the liberties that he considers. Mill himself is at pains in On Liberty to
make this important point:
[I]t must by no means be supposed, because damage, or
probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone
justify the interference of society, that therefore it always
does justify such interference.
In many cases, an
individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and
therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others.4 0
He rates the "liberty of thought and discussion," the inseparable
combination of "the liberty of thought and feeling," and the "liberty of
expressing and publishing opinions," as illustrated by his example of
circulating a harsh characterization of corn dealers through the press, to be
of such transcendent social value, so integral to "utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being," that it
must be treated as an "absolute freedom" even though it "belongs to that
part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people."'A And
" Id. at 80.
40
Id. at 156.
41 Id. at 81-82, 86. A number of leading scholars conclude that Mill does not view the
liberty of thought and discussion as limited by the Harm Principle in the way that the other
liberties he discusses in the essay are. See, e.g., SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL, supra note
19, at 373-74 ("[W]e must see liberty of expression as supplementing the Liberty Principle
[what in this essay I am calling the "Harm Principle"], rather than as constituting a special
case of it. All acts, including acts of expression, are protected by the Liberty Principle if
they do not harm others. In the case of expressions, however, the Principle of Liberty of
Expression spells out further safeguards, defining limits within which a certain type of
discourse-discussion, honest dialogue-is protected from social sanction."); see also JoHN
GRAY, MLL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENCE 103-06 (2d ed. 1996); GEOFFREY SCARRE, MILL'S ON
(continued)
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for Mill, I maintain, "absolute" means unqualifiedly immune from
comprehensive, context-independent regulation-the kind of regulation
that aims to banish an idea, not just contain its harmful effects. In this
regard, a partial, context-dependent regulation of speech, as in his example
involving the excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer,
does not violate the "absolute freedom of thought and sentiment on all
subjects," and thus, can be justified under certain circumstances by its
contribution to the prevention of harm.42
This reading of Mill not only makes sense of the corn dealer example,
it also resolves an apparent major inconsistency in his argument. How, it
might be asked, can Mill claim at the outset of On Liberty that "I regard
utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions"A3 and still favor
unqualified protection for the liberty of thought and discussion?
Utilitarians, "progressive" no less than "hedonic," by definition count the
cost." Noticing this problem, some astute and sympathetic students of
Mill refuse to take him at his word regarding his utilitarian bona fides, at
least in On Liberty.4 5 I think they are mistaken. For the limited set of
activities that he labels "thought and discussion"-the activities that
Geoffrey Marshall elaborates as "discussion, advocacy, debate, or

LIBERTY: A READER's GUIDE 39-40 (2007); Richard Vernon, Beyond the Harm Principle:
Mill and Censorship, in MILL AND THE MORAL CHARACTER OF LIBERALISM 115, 120-22
(Eldon J. Eisenach ed., 1998).
42 Jonathan Riley agrees with this interpretation regarding how Mill's "absolute"
protection for the liberty of thought and discussion does not preclude regulation of the time,
place, and manner of speech. Riley, supra note 32, at 63. However, Riley also maintains
that a number of content-based total prohibitions designed to prevent harm are also
compatible with Mill's analysis in Chapter Two of On Liberty, id. at 76-79, a reading I do
not find persuasive.
43
MILL, supra note 11, at 81.
4

See J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM FOR & AGAINST 12-13

(1973).
45 See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life, in FOUR ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY 173, 190-92 (1969) ("At the centre of Mill's thought and feeling lies, not his
utilitarianism, nor the concern about enlightenment, nor about dividing the private from the
public domain .. . but his passionate belief that men are made human by their capacity for
choice-choice of evil and good equally. Fallibility, the right to err, as a corollary of the
capacity for self-improvement; distrust of symmetry and finality as enemies of freedomthese are the principles which Mill never abandons."); ALAN RYAN, J. S. MILL 132 (1974)
("[I]t is clear that claiming this as a utilitarian position is silly; its real status is that of an
ideal-regarding defence of liberalism, and one would do better to own up to it.").
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expression of opinion,"A that John Skorupski calls "honest dialogue,'
and that Richard Vernon defines as "propositions about actual or desirable
states of affairs in the world, propositions capable of being accumulated
into larger bodies of knowledge"4A-Mill is prepared to assert at a high
level of generality that their long-run social benefits outweigh their longrun social costs. As a result, such activities are, in his utilitarian calculus,
entitled to "absolute freedom" 4 9 in the sense that society has no authority to
attempt to eliminate them, no warrant to treat them as per se illegitimate,
no power to prohibit them so long as they retain their basic character as
endeavors of inquiry and persuasion. In this one respect, Mill is making
what we now call a "rule utilitarian" (as contrasted with "act utilitarian")
argument.so For all the other liberties he defends, however, including the
liberty of "tastes and pursuits," of "combination among individuals," and
of forms of communication (including "instigation") that are more actionoriented, less open-ended and deliberative, than is "thought and
discussion" as he uses those terms, Mill employs a context-sensitive act
utilitarian methodology. Such activities, valuable though they may be, can
be restricted when the harms they are thought to cause outweigh their
benefits in the particular circumstances.
This difference between the two kinds of utilitarian arguments that
Mill is making in On Liberty is why Chapter Two, the only chapter in
which he makes a rule utilitarian argument of high generality, contains
neither a discussion of the Harm Principle nor any analysis of the specific
harms that particular thoughts and discussions might engender. When Mill
gets to Chapter Three and the subject of "positive instigation," he becomes
highly specific about context and consequences, for there he is making an
act utilitarian argument governed by the Harm Principle. And there is
where the on-site corn dealer example appears. 5' Mill then continues to
4

See MARSHALL, supra note 23, at 157.

47 See SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 19, at 374.
48

See Richard Vernon, John Stuart Mill and Pornography:Beyond the Harm Principle,

106 ETHICS 621, 623 (1996).
49 MILL, supra note 11, at 82.
50 See, e.g., J. D. Mabbott, Interpretations of Mill's 'Utilitarianism',
6 PHIL. Q. 115,
115-20 (1956); Maurice Mandelbaum, Two Moot Issues in Mill's Utilitarianism,in MILL:
A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS, 206, 206-21 (J.B. Schneewind ed., 1968); J. 0.
Urmson, The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J .S. Mill, 3 PHIL. Q. 33, 33-39
(1953).
5 His reference in Chapter Three to the activity of circulating through the press the
opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor is to illustrate how this Chapter Two
(continued)
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apply his act utilitarian methodology as he analyzes in Chapters Three,
Four, and Five a number of activities that qualify as exercises of liberty but
that do not qualify as thought or discussion. In these passages, he treats it
as relevant, though not conclusive, that the activity in a particular instance
is likely to cause harm. Such harm-causing potential in individual
instances receives no attention in Chapter Two because there he is
applying a rule utilitarian methodology under which the balance of benefit
and harm has already been determined at a very high level of generality.
For the narrow set of activities that he classifies as thought and discussion,
a set much smaller than the full corpus of communicative activities we
commonly label as "speech," the benefits of thought and discussion are
ruled to outweigh the harms categorically.
It may seem strange that Mill should apply different forms of
utilitarian analysis in different chapters of On Liberty, but the reason is
simple. Only for the uniquely valuable activities he calls thought and
discussion-uniquely valuable in his view of the world, which places such
emphasis on progress through knowledge 52 -is he able to say with any
confidence that their long-run benefits on the whole exceed their long-run
costs, and that efforts to carve out specific exceptions to this generalization
are likely to result in myopic judgments or social dynamics that undercut
the process by which the benefits are generated.
To test this reading of Mill further, and to explore which kinds of
context-sensitive regulations of speech his principle of liberty, as
illustrated by the corn dealer example, would permit, I will examine two
cases decided a decade ago involving very different forms of anti-abortion
advocacy. Planned Parenthoodv. American Coalition of Life Activists53
raised the issue of whether various messages displayed by anti-abortion
activists on posters and on a website were entitled to First Amendment
protection.5 4 One poster distributed at several rallies contained under the
heading "The Deadly Dozen" the names, photographs, and addresses of
The poster
thirteen doctors who were said to be performing abortions.
accused these doctors of crimes against humanity and offered a $5,000
activity differs from his example of on-site positive instigation that is subject to his act
utilitarian Harm Principle. Vilifying corn dealers through the press Mill takes to fall within
the absolutely protected liberty of thought and discussion. As such, a discussion of its harm
potential is irrelevant (and thus never supplied by Mill).
52 See MILL, supra note 11, at 96-97, 101-03.
s 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
'Id.
at 1062.
" Id. at 1064--65.
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award "for information leading to arrest, conviction and revocation of
One of the website postings listed the
license to practice medicine."5
names of 200 "abortionists" with the legend: "Black font (working);
Greyed-out Name (wounded); Strikethrough (fatality)."s? The names of
abortion providers on the list who had been murdered were struck through,
and those who had been injured in attacks were greyed out.58 On other
occasions, several of the defendants in the case had publicly defended as
justifiable homicide previous killings of doctors who had performed
abortions, some of whom had been targeted in earlier "wanted" posters
published by opponents of abortion."
The judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing the case en
banc, divided over whether under these circumstances the speakers should
have believed that the targeted doctors would interpret the postings as
expressing an intention on the part of the speakers, or agents under their
control, personally to harm or assault the named doctors. Six judges
answered this question in the affirmative,o five in the negative. 6 ' All the
judges agreed, however, that such a finding of belief on the part of the
speakers is necessary for the communication to be a "true threat" that can
be regulated under current First Amendment doctrine.62 Moreover, all the
56

id.

"
Id. at 1065.
58

id.

s Id. at 1064.
6o Id. at 1085-86.
61 Id. at 1090-92.
62 Id. at 1075-77, 1089. In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), the Court offered
this description of the doctrine of true threats:
"True threats" encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.
The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a
prohibition on true threats "protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders," in addition to
protecting people "from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur." Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person
or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of
bodily harm or death.
Id. at 359-60 (internal citations omitted). Presumably, although the matter is debatable,
under this definition a speaker's intention to intimidate by informing his targets that third
(continued)
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Ninth Circuit judges assumed that in the absence of such a finding of the
specific intent necessary to constitute a true threat, a poster or website
advocating the killing of abortion providers is protected under the First
Amendment, even when accompanied by names and addresses and even in
a context in which several such killings had followed the earlier
publication of messages of a similar content and format.
Does Mill's argument in On Liberty support this understanding of the
freedom of speech? I doubt it, though I think the question is close. Had
the posters and websites contained only general arguments or assertions to
the effect that doctors who perform abortions are murderers who deserve to
die, the case would be analogous to that of circulating in the press the
opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor. The extra degree of
moral condemnation and greater specificity of the suggested retribution in
the abortion example do not seem to me to be enough to differentiate the
cases so far as Mill's argument is concerned. The "absolute freedom of
opinion and sentiment" that Mill endorses64 entails as a general matter the
right to disseminate even the most dangerous and disgusting views no
matter the harm that is likely to follow. It is central to his basic
understanding of the relationship between the liberty of thought and human
flourishing that all ideas must be free to circulate as widely as audience
interest can sustain, not least in order to instruct by virtue of their falsity
and dangerousness. Mill's qualification of the liberty to express opinions

parties not under the control of the speaker will engage in violence against them is
insufficient to make an utterance a true threat in the First Amendment sense. That is what
all of the judges of the Ninth Circuit concluded in PlannedParenthood,290 F.3d at 1076,
1089-90, and what seems to be implied by the first sentence of the passage from Virginia v.
Black just quoted. On the other hand, if the essence of the harm from a "true threat" is not
so much the risk of a violent act by the speaker but rather, as the court asserts, the
debilitating fear that is intentionally created in the target's mind by the speaker's statement,
then perhaps it should not be necessary that the frightened target is led to believe that the
speaker himself or someone under his control will be the agent of the promised attack.
Plenty of fear can be deliberately generated by a speaker talking about the violent intentions
of independent third parties. For a critique of the Virginia v. Black decision that questions
whether the true-threats exclusion should be conditioned on any sort of speaker intent
requirement, let alone one so strict as the Court appeared to impose in that case, see
Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the FirstAmendment: The Case of CrossBurning, 2003 SUP. CT. REv. 197, 216-22.
63 See Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First
Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1337, 1391-92, 1395 & n.293, 1402 (2006).
6 MILL, supra note 11, at 82.
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is not activated by a sufficient measure of predicted harm, only by the
presence of special circumstances that make the dissemination something
more than the expression of an opinion, circumstances that make it "a
positive instigation to a mischievous act."
In my judgment, the addition to the anti-abortion postings of names,
pictures, and especially addresses crosses the line that Mill seeks to
identify with his corn dealer example. I reach this conclusion not because
the addition of names, pictures, and addresses increases the probability that
the characterization of abortion providers as murderers will lead to their
being harmed, though surely the inclusion of such targeting information
Were the postings with the added
does increase that probability.
information to qualify as integral to the freedom of thought, as Mill
understands the concept, under his argument in On Liberty the extra
measure of danger would not suffice to justify regulation. But two other
features of the postings that follow from the added information might
indeed constitute special circumstances that would turn the postings into
positive instigations to mischievous acts.
First, the additional information provides a basis to impute to the
speakers the intention to cause the killing, harming, or intimidation of the
named abortion providers, even if not necessarily the intention personally
to undertake a violent act. 6 The speaker addressing an excited mob

65

Id. at 121.

Judge Kozinski, dissenting in Planned Parenthoodv. American Coalition of Life
Activists, noted the absence of any evidence in the record of the speakers' intentions apart
from what might be inferred from the posters and websites themselves. Planned
Parenthood,290 F.3d at 1092 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). He found that absence crucial:
"Given this lack of evidence, the posters can be viewed, at most, as a call to arms for other
abortion protesters to harm plaintiffs." Id. In his view, and that of the majority of the Ninth
Circuit as well, such an intention is not sufficient to exclude a speech from First
Amendment protection under either the "true threats" exclusion or under the Supreme
Court's holding in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which permits the regulation
of the advocacy of violence that is to be undertaken by third parties only when such
advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action." Id. at 447 (emphasis added). As explained above, under the
current law of the First Amendment, it very likely is significant for the application of the
"true threats" exclusion whether the speaker threatens personally to engage in violence or
instead deliberately causes the targets of his protest to fear that others not under his control
will attack them, see supra notes 53-63 and text accompanying, but that difference is not
significant for the argument I am making regarding how a speaker's intention bears on
Mill's understanding of the limits of free speech. Even if Judge Kozinski is correct
(continued)
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outside the home of a corn dealer also can fairly be assumed to have
violence in mind by virtue of his choice of venue and audience. Mill's use
of the term "positive instigation" to mark the limits of his liberty principle
suggests that he considers the speaker's intent to be a variable that bears on
whether the communicative activity falls within the scope of the liberty of
thought and discussion.
regarding what the inclusion of the names and addresses of abortion providers implies about
the speaker's intention, my analysis still holds.
67 C. L. Ten, a careful and perceptive reader of Mill, might disagree with me on this
point. Ten says that in Mill's example of a speech to an excited mob before the house of a
corn dealer:
[T]he speaker may neither intend nor even welcome any harm to the
corn-dealers, and yet, in the given circumstances, his speech would be a
causally relevant factor in bringing about the harm. He need not be
urging the excited crowd to commit any 'mischievous act', but none the
less harmful acts are very likely to result. The most that one could infer
from Mill's description is that the speaker was carelessly indifferent to
the fate of the corn-dealer, or that he was unusually stupid in not
foreseeing that harm would result from the expression of his view in the
given situation.
He then concedes that this reading of the corn dealer
example raises some problems for Mill's argument:
TEN, supra note 19, at 132-33.

Because the notion of 'instigation' in the corn-dealer case is a causal
and not an intentional concept, it appears that Mill is not confining
restrictions to freedom of expression merely to contexts where someone
urges others, with the probability of success, to commit specific harmful
acts. But there is now a real danger that the restrictions of freedom of
expression that are permitted by Mill's remarks in the corn-dealer
example may be far greater than he supposes, or would be prepared to
accept.
Id. at 133. Ten proceeds to examine the case in which 'the publication of a certain book
may reasonably be expected to lead, after a time-lag, to much more serious damage than
would have been caused by the speech outside the corn-dealer's house."' Id. (quoting J. W.
N. Watkins, John StuartMill and the Liberty of the Individual, in POLITICAL IDEAS 154, 165
(David Thomson ed., 1966)). He argues that such a book ought not to be considered
"causal" of that damage for the purpose of Mill's analysis due to the contingencies and
uncertainties introduced by the time factor. Id. at 135.
My own view is that a better way to rescue Mill's argument while being faithful to his
text is to read "instigation" to imply intention on the part of the speaker to cause harm
(including the harm of intimidation) or at least careless indifference about consequences.
(continued)
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In other respects as well, Mill holds speakers to demanding standards
regarding their intentions. For example, unlike most leading proponents of
a strong free speech principle, Mill believes there is no objection in
principle to the enforcement of what he terms a "morality of public
discussion."68 Were it not for the practical difficulty of administering such
limitations evenhandedly, he says in On Liberty that he would favor laws
and social punishments designed to eliminate from public debate such
tactics as "to argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to
misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion," all
instances of a wrongful intention to deceive one's audience.6 9 Admittedly,
there is a difference between the intention to cause material harm and the
intention to deceive, so far as Mill's valuing of the freedom of speech is
concerned. Only in the latter case is the audience's agency compromised.
Just as Mill famously argues for the value of false ideas as foils that can
contribute to a deeper understanding of true propositions,70 he might
consider messages from ill-intentioned speakers to be resources that wellintentioned listeners might use to advance social utility. But when the
speaker's (imputed) intention to cause harm is combined with the
additional circumstances of an audience Mill describes as "an excited
mob" and the presence of an inviting target of the speaker's wrath ready at
hand, the audience's agency might be thought to fall short of the minimum
that Mill considers necessary for the liberty of thought and discussion to be
implicated.7 ' The presumed intentions, capacities, and even attitudes that
typically animate particular activities, including various activities of
Moreover, even if Ten is right that intention or careless indifference on the part of the
speaker need not be a necessary element of "positive instigation" as Mill uses the term,
such that the unlawfulness of the speech to the excited mob before the corn dealer's house
might follow entirely from the probability of immediate harm under the circumstances, that
would not mean that in other cases the speaker's intention would be irrelevant to the finding
of "positive instigation"; the presence of a speaker's specific intention to cause harm could
still be a weighty factor rendering a speech regulable under Mill's analysis or even a
sufficient condition for Mill to consider the speech a "positive instigation" subject to
regulation. Such a specific intention to cause at a minimum the harm of intimidation can be
inferred, I maintain, from the speaker's act of including the names and addresses of abortion
doctors whom he characterizes as murderers deserving of retribution.
68 MILL, supra note 11, at 120.
6

1Id. at 118-20.
"oId.at 103-12.
71 On the role that this concern for the autonomous agency of listeners plays in Mill's
argument, see GRAY, supra note 41, at 104-05.
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communicating, play a more significant role in Mill's analysis of the
claims and bounds of liberty than is commonly recognized. On Liberty is
an unusual type of utilitarian argument that is based in large part on a
character ideal,72 and intentions are an important dimension of character.
Second, adding the targeting information alters the focus of the antiabortion message, making it less of an invitation to discussion and
reflection and more of a guide to action. Mill's entire argument in Chapter
Two of On Liberty is a call to reap the benefits of open-minded, sustained
truth-seeking. It has nothing to do with acting out, getting grievances off
one's chest, or making other persons an instrument of one's will by
appealing to their baser instincts or giving them the tools (including
information) to do one's bidding. The use of words for any purpose is not
what Mill seeks to protect with his arguments for the liberty of thought and
discussion. Communications that are not so facilitative of discussion as
to be integral to the freedom of thought are exercises of liberty in Mill's
theory, but they are exercises of liberty that are potentially regulable under
his act utilitarian Harm Principle, though only if the harms they are
predicted to cause outweigh the benefits they generate.74 The harm that
targeting speech can cause-indeed has caused-is obvious and
considerable. 75 That anti-abortion targeting speech comes wrapped in a
moral argument does not inoculate it from regulation under Mill's analysis.
Recall that his speaker addressing an excited mob before the corn dealer's
house is expressing a moral criticism.
The second abortion case that I will use to explicate Mill's corn dealer
example is Hill v. Colorado,n decided by the United States Supreme Court
in the year 2000. In the wake of several cases involving injunctions
against on-site anti-abortion protests that were prompted by incidents of
physical harassment and intimidation of women entering clinics,78 the
72

See Peter Berkowitz, Mill: Liberty, Virtue, and the Discipline of Individuality, in

MILL AND THE MORAL CHARACTER OF LIBERALISM, supra note 41, at 13, 25-39; Ten

Cate,

supra note 13, at 50-52.
n See SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 19, at 369-76.
74

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058,
1063-64 (9th Cir. 2002).
76
MILL, supra note 11, at 121.
" 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
78 See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). See generally Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of
Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected
(continued)
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Colorado legislature attempted to address the problem with a general law,
backed by criminal sanctions, that governed conduct within 100 feet of the
entrance of any health-care facility, including on a public street or
Would-be speakers were prohibited from knowingly
sidewalk.7 9
approaching within eight feet of another person, without her consent, for
the purpose of passing a leaflet, displaying a sign, or engaging in oral
protest, education, or counseling.80 The law did not single out specific
messages for restriction,8' but no one could doubt the content of the
messages that would be most affected. A divided Supreme Court upheld
the law on the basis that it was not a total prohibition but rather a
reasonable regulation of the time, manner, and place of speech that served
the legitimate state interest of protecting "those who seek medical
treatment from the potential physical and emotional harm suffered when an
unwelcome [speaker] delivers a message (whatever its content) by
physically approaching an individual at close range." 82
In dissent, Justice Kennedy found the restriction of speech to be
anything but partial and reasonable:
The means of expression at stake here are of
Citizens desiring to impart
controlling importance.
messages to women considering abortions likely do not
have resources to use the mainstream media for their
message, much less resources to locate women
contemplating the option of abortion. Lacking the aid of
the government or the media, they seek to resort to the
time honored method of leafleting and the display of signs.
Nowhere is the speech more important than at the time and
place where the act is about to occur.
...

What the statute restricts is one person trying to

communicate to another, which ought to be the heart of
civilized discourse.

Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 553, 554 (1996) ("The goal of
this paper is to resolve three issues related to freedom of speech and abortion rights that
arise out of the civil and criminal litigation surrounding protest activity in the vicinity of
clinics providing abortion services.").
79
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122 (2010) (originally enacted in 1993).
so Id. § 18-9-122(3).
' See id. § 18-9-122.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 704-05, 719 n.25.
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I am in full agreement with Justice Scalia's

explanation of the insult the Court gives when it tells us
these grave moral matters can be discussed just as well
through a bullhorn.
How, in light of his corn dealer example, should Mill think about this
case? I do not believe that the restriction imposed by the Colorado law
should be considered a total ban on whatever ideas the protestors wish to
communicate to women about to have abortions. Even if the speaker's
"idea" is conceived to be not a general moral proposition but rather a
personally directed message ("You should not do this because it is
immoral"), the alternative means of communicating that specific message
left open by the statute, including signs visible and statements audible from
a distance of greater than eight feet,84 are enough to take the case outside
the realm that Mill marks off for absolute protection incident to the
freedom of thought. Accordingly, under the analysis presented in On
Liberty his Harm Principle applies. Protection turns on whether the
freedom claimed by the protestors to approach within eight feet of their
unwilling addressees causes harm of a sort and magnitude that outweighs
the benefits that flow from such an opportunity to speak at close quarters.
One kind of harm that can be caused by the type of communication at
issue in Hill is that of creating in the recipients of the anti-abortion
message the kind of distress that all of us commonly experience when we
learn that others find our beliefs or actions to be immoral. But even though
this type of harm is real, and can be intense, Mill cannot count it, as Jeremy
Waldron has demonstrated." For Mill's argument in On Liberty, not just
in Chapter Two but throughout, is all about the benefits that follow from
the fact that even our most cherished beliefs and practices are corrigible,
subject to alteration in the face of evidence, argument, and experience.
The capacity to rethink basic understandings and practices is the key to
progress in Mill's utilitarian conception, but the experience of altering
one's ways in response to criticism is seldom pain-free. Moral distress, we
might even say, is integral to improvement, at least for persons who care
deeply about their beliefs and practices, and those are precisely the kinds
83 Id. at

788-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122.
85 See Waldron, supra note 32, at 115-33.
86 MILL, supra note 11, at 90.
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of persons that Mill considers most likely to advance collective wellbeing." Because moral distress is integral to progress, it cannot count as
harm in Mill's analysis, however painful it might be.
There are other kinds of harm, however, that might be caused by the
act of a protestor approaching at close quarters a woman who is en route to
have an abortion. One is apprehension about physical harassment, an
apprehension that can have adverse medical consequences even when in
the event physical harassment does not occur and may never have been
likely to occur. Another potential harm is upset resulting from having
one's personal space invaded by an unwelcome critic. This is not quite the
same thing as the distress that is a product of the judgments and
accusations one endures when being subjected to serious moral criticism.
Nevertheless, physical invasion is a tricky type of harm for Mill because he
does explicitly recognize a right in each of us to "obtrude" on another
person whom we believe to be going astray with "considerations to aid his
judgment, exhortations to strengthen his will."88 The question is debatable,
but I conclude that these experiences of physical apprehension and
invasion are harms that can count in Mill's analysis because they do cause
pain and to consider them would not subvert his overall utilitarian
argument, as would counting the harm of moral distress.
But what should a Millian make of Justice Kennedy's claim that much
valuable speech is lost when on-site abortion protestors are denied the
opportunity to plead their cause at close quarters, face-to-face with
personal appeal, rationally and quietly, without having to resort to
bullhorns or shocking signs and pictures capable of grabbing attention
from afar? Can such attempted up-close-and-personal moral persuasion be
analogized to addressing an excited mob before the home of a corn dealer,
so far as the social value of the speech is concerned? By choosing a venue
in which his audience is "an excited mob" capable of acting immediately,
the speaker in the corn dealer example reduces the likelihood that his
message will serve the values relating to adaptation, self-authorship,
variety for its own sake, and progress that Mill identifies as the reasons for
according liberty exceptionally high priority in his utilitarian calculus.8 9
That is not so clearly the case with the speakers' claim in Hill to be able to
approach within eight feet of their addressees. There, the speakers' choice
7

Id. at 124-25.

" Id. at 140.
8 See SKORUPSKI, JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 19, at 371-72; TEN, supra note 19, at
130-31.
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of time and venue can be explained on grounds other than the desire to take
advantage of vulnerable listeners analogous to the stirring up of an excited
mob. Although the background noise and social pressure of a mass
demonstration reduces the probability that Millian thought and discussion
will result from the face-to-face encounter-as does the fact that the
addressee is likely to be hurried, nervous, and defensive-the speaker's
intention may very well be to communicate in a way that is respectful of
the listener's moral agency. If so, Mill's argument in On Liberty offers
reasons to consider the speaker's effort to be an exercise of liberty that
deserves a high degree of protection from social regulation. That the
participants in this conversation begin miles apart in their moral
understanding and sharply divergent in their objectives is a gulf that Mill,
of all thinkers, cannot treat as a factor that diminishes its utility. As he
remarks in Principles ofPoliticalEconomy:
It is hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present
low state of human improvement, of placing human beings
in contact with persons dissimilar to themselves, and with
modes of thought and action unlike those with which they
are familiar.... Such communication has always been,
and is peculiarly in the present age, one of the primary
sources of progress.90
I conclude that even though the regulation of speech at issue in Hill v.
Colorado was context-dependent and as such not a violation of Mill's
"absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects," 91 the social
value of some of the sidewalk counseling communications that were
disallowed by the Colorado statute should count for quite a bit in
calculating the balance of goods and harms that an application of Mill's
Harm Principle requires.92
Moreover, a plausible reason to decide to protest at a health-care
facility by means of face-to-face conversations with women about to have
abortions is to bear witness to one's moral beliefs in a deeply personal way
90 JOHN STUART MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR
APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1848),

in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART

MILL 594 (J. M. Robson ed., 1965).
91MILL, supra note 11, at 82.
92 For a careful analysis of the implications of Mill's argument for laws regulating the
manner of communication, with specific reference to Hill v. Colorado,see Heidi Kitrosser,
From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First
Amendment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1339, 1376-80 (2002).
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by confronting at its source the practice one condemns, even when the
odds of changing any woman's mind are very small. That experience of
bearing witness might not be an exercise of the liberty of thought and
discussion, but it is an instance of what Mill terms the liberty of pursuits,
practicing a self-defining way of life. This is a liberty he does not protect
absolutely but rather subjects to his Harm Principle, but still it is a liberty
that Mill considers to be important to human flourishing. The value of this
liberty must also count in the balance against the harms that can flow from
unwanted, and sometimes overly aggressive, sidewalk counseling by
opponents of abortion.
Thus, for a Millian, Hill v. Colorado is not an easy case for regulation
in the way that the case of the speaker before the home of the corn dealer
is. Nor is it as strong a case for regulation as is the inclusion of names,
pictures, and addresses of abortion providers on a website or on posters
widely circulated at anti-abortion rallies. It seems possible that a state
might be able, through the combination of skillful statutory drafting and
professional, even-handed law enforcement, to prevent all aggressive,
physically intimidating activities by protestors at abortion facilities without
having to employ general rules that also sweep peaceful, respectful
sidewalk counselors into the net. If so, Mill's argument should be read to
support the right of the latter type of speaker to approach an addressee at
close quarters.

III. FALSELY SHOUTING "FIRE!" INA THEATER
I turn now to what is probably the most famous of all hypothetical
cases designed to mark the limits of the freedom of speech. In Schenck v.
United States,94 decided in 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing
for a unanimous Court, introduced his influential clear-and-present-danger
test with these examples:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an
injunction against uttering words that may have all the
effect of force. The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they

MILL, supra note 11, at 83.
94 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
9
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will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.s
The fire-in-a-theater example has taken on a life of its own. It has become
a staple of popular debate about the limits of free speech, but Holmes'
specification that the shout is false is often omitted, as is the datum that a
panic actually ensues. 97 And for some reason, the theater is always
described as crowded,98 though Holmes never said that.
It appears that incendiary matters and metaphors held a special appeal
for Holmes. When his Civil War letters and diary were published, the title
chosen by the editors was "Touched by Fire," after a phrase of Holmes' in
a well-known speech he had given in 1884 reflecting on his war
experience. 99 One of his earliest ventures into legal scholarship was an
important article he published in his early thirties on a London gas stokers
strike. 00 Both in writing his book The Common Law and as a judge of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, Holmes was uncharacteristically expansive
Id. at 52 (internal citation omitted).
See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the "Clear and Present
Danger" Theory of the FirstAmendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1118, 1136 (1989); L.A.
Powe, Jr., Searchingfor the False Shout of "Fire," 19 CONST. CoMMENT. 345, 345 n.2
(2002) (documenting instances in which President George H. W. Bush, Senator Jesse
Helms, Charleton Heston, Christopher Hitchens, Newton Minow, and William F. Buckley
all invoked the fire-in-a-theatre example while neglecting to mention that Holmes had
specified that the unprotected speech is false).
9 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 133 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988);
Darren Bush, The "Marketplace of Ideas:" Is Judge Posner Chasing Don Quixote's
Windmills?, 32 AIz. ST. L.J. 1107, 1130 (2000); Maria L. Marcus, Policing Speech on the
Airwaves: Granting Rights, Preventing Wrongs, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 447, 478-79
(1997); Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1035,
1040 (2002).
9 See, e.g., William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 107, 113-14 (1982); Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, The
New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 838 (1984); Rodney A. Smolla, Content and
Context: The Contributionsof William Van Alstyne to First Amendment Interpretation,54
DuKE L.J. 1623, 1629-31 (2005).
9 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Memorial Day Address
at Keene, New Hampshire (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMEs 80, 86 (Richard
Posner ed., 1992); TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 1861-1864 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Fordham Univ. Press 2000)
(1946).
' Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Summary of Events: Great Britain-The Gas-Stokers'
Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 558,582-84 (1873).
9s
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in discussing arson cases, real and hypothetical, while developing his
creative and controversial theory of the law of criminal attempts.' 0'
Holmes' last published words, written a week before his death, were these:
We aim at the infinite and when our arrow falls to earth it
is in flames.
At times the ambitious ends of life have made it seem
to me lonely, but it has not been. You have given me the
companionship of dear friends who have helped to keep
alive the fire in my heart. If I could think that I have sent a
spark to those who come after I should be ready to say

Goodbye.10 2
One of Holmes' colleagues on the Supreme Court once justified the
criminal conviction of a radical speaker by observing that "[a] single
revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst
into a sweeping and destructive conflagration."' 0 3 Predictably, Holmes
could not resist answering in kind: "It is said that this manifesto was more
than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement....
Eloquence may set fire to reason.""4 It turns out that Holmes not only
wrote about fires, he followed them. Permit me to quote Scot Powe's
account of this avocation:
Charles Henry Butler, Holmes' friend and Eye Street
neighbor, reports walking home from the Capitol with
Holmes when the justice grabbed his arm upon hearing a
fire engine: "I always go to fires, don't you?" And they
were off, soon dogtrotting down Capitol Hill and up
Maryland Avenue, as Holmes further observed that in
Boston "we always run to fires." 05
It is fun to speculate about the psychology that led Holmes to posit the
case of the false shout of fire in a theater, but what we most need to know

101See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 53-56 (Dover Publ'n 1991)
(1881); Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 55-57 (1901).
'0 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Arrow in Flames, in THE MIND AND FAIrH OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 451, 451 (Max Lerner ed., 1943).
103 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925).
1 Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
105 Powe, supra note 96,
at 351.
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is what the example proves. Not much, in the opinion of my First
Amendment teacher, Harry Kalven, Jr:
[T]he example has long seemed to me trivial and
misleading. It is as if the only conceivable controversy
over speech policy were with an adversary who asserts that
all use of words is absolutely immunized under the First
The "fire" example then triumphantly
Amendment.
impeaches this massive major premise. Beyond that, it
adds nothing to our understanding.10 6
If Holmes' only point is that "no law abridging the freedom of speech"
does not mean the same thing as "no law regulating the use of words," that
such activities as perjury, blackmail, extortion, and bribery do not raise
First Amendment issues, his theater example is jejune, hardly worthy of
the prominence it has achieved in popular culture.
On the other hand, we might be tempted to read Holmes as using the
illustration to make a very broad claim indeed: that all speech is subject to
regulation under the First Amendment if in the particular circumstances of
its dissemination it is highly likely to cause harm. Notice that Holmes
invoked the theater example in the same case, in fact the same paragraph,
in which he introduced his famous clear-and-present-danger test.' In that
case, and in two additional cases he decided the same year, Holmes
mentioned other examples of self-evidently consequential speech that he
considered unprotected by the First Amendment: persuasion to murder'08
and "uttering words that may have all the effect of force," as in a direction
to boycott issued by a labor leader. 09 So is the only point of the theater
example that certain instances of free speech are simply too dangerous to
abide?
During the decade when Holmes devised his example, the great danger
inherent in shouting "Fire!" in a theater was a matter of well-publicized
recent experience. A stampede that took twenty-six lives occurred on
August 26, 1911 in a silent movie theater in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania
when a film projector flared up and an audience member, mistakenly
believing that the building itself was burning, yelled "Fire!"'"10 Two years
supra note 97, at 133.
See supra text accompanying note 95.
108 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
109 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
110See Powe, supra note 96, at 348-49.
'0

107
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later, a meeting hall filled with hundreds of striking copper miners in
Calumet, Michigan was thrown into panic when someone, apparently an
outsider aggrieved by the strike, peeked in and maliciously yelled "Fire!"
when there was no reason to suppose there was one."' Seventy-three
persons died in the scramble for the exits.1 12 Both tragic incidents were
reported by newspapers across the country."'
The key question to ask about Holmes' theater example as an
illustration of his test for protecting speech is whether, in addition to the
obvious danger involved, he considered any of the following features of
the hypothesized case to be pertinent to its probative value: (1) the falsity
of the message; (2) the fact that a panic is not just a risk but actually
occurs; (3) the absence from the speaker's message of any general idea or
observation; and (4) the extreme inability of the intended audience under
the circumstances to evaluate the truth of the message or reflect upon what
to do about it assuming it to be true. If none of these variables mattered to
Holmes, we might be justified in taking his example to support the notion
that all speech that is sufficiently dangerous can be regulated. But if he
believed that the power of his example turns on one or more of these
variables, he must have thought that more than the predicted
dangerousness of an utterance determines whether it is protected under the
First Amendment.
Holmes famously argued in two renowned dissents that dangers likely
to materialize only in the middle or distant future cannot justify making it a
crime to disseminate general political ideas and criticisms;"l4 that is what
he took to be the import of his clear-and-present-danger test. Did Holmes
think that the theater example explains why only "present" or "imminent"
dangers should count? To be sure, the harm in that case occurs instantly,
but why did Holmes see fit to throw in the other variables just listed that
characterize the theater example? One could produce an example of
speech that risks causing harm in a short time frame that has none of those
variables. Mill's speaker before the home of the corn dealer is one such
1
"
Id. at 349.
11
2 id.

"1 Id. at 348 n.27, 349 n.34. Robert Tsai's research found that "[b]etween 1875 and
1920, there were at least four devastating theater fires in the continental United States and
Puerto Rico, killing over 1200 people" and another 1020 deaths from theater fires in the
United Kingdom, Paris, and Vienna.
See Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and
ConstitutionalMyth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 196 n.57 (2004).
114 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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example, known to Holmes from his rereading of On Liberty a few weeks
before he wrote his Schenck opinion."s Moreover, even if Holmes' theater
example offers an especially vivid instance of speech causing great
suffering almost immediately, that demonstration says very little about
why such a short-and-direct scenario of harm causation should be not just a
sufficient but also a necessary condition for regulation. It is the latter
proposition that is the more interesting and controversial aspect of the
clear-and-present-danger test. The requirement that the harm occur
imminently, when applicable, precludes the regulation of most forms of
pornography and racial hate speech, for example. Possibly Holmes was
drawn to the theater situation because in it there is no opportunity for the
audience to evaluate the speaker's message or for outside observers to
discredit it. He might have thought the example highlights by contrast
those instances in which the law can, as he put it in Abrams v. United
States, "leave the correction of evil counsels to time.',tt Once again,
however, we must ask how much the unavailability of the remedy of
"time" in the theater example tells us about the adequacy of that
mysterious corrective for situations in which the dangers created or
exacerbated by speech may develop more slowly.
In seeking to understand the import of his theater example, it is helpful
to consider other hypothetical speech cases that Holmes invoked to defend
and delineate his clear-and-present danger test. In Abrams, he said:
A patriot might think that we were wasting money on
aeroplanes, or making more cannon of a certain kind than
we needed, and might advocate curtailment with success,
yet even if it turned out that the curtailment hindered and
was thought by other minds to have been obviously likely
to hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war,
no one would hold such conduct a crime.'17
And later in the same opinion: "Congress certainly cannot forbid all
effort to change the mind of the country.""' Ever the common-law judge,
Holmes used specific examples to identify not only the speech that society
1s See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Justice, to Harold
J. Laski (Feb. 28, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERs: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI 1916-1935, at 187 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1953).
116 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7
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must have the power to regulate but also the speech that any defensible
First Amendment test must be able to protect. And what the examples as a
whole demonstrate, I believe, is that Holmes looked not only to the danger
posed by an utterance but also to the social function of the category of
speech in dispute. Only for speech of a certain, particularly valuable sort
did he think his protective clear-and-present-danger test should govern.
For all other speech, Holmes was prepared to uphold regulation on the
basis of the non-imminent, necessarily speculative harms it might be
thought to cause. One passage of his eloquent dissent in the Abrams case
that is too often overlooked cautions: "I am speaking only of expressions
of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were uttered here."" 9
His famous free market test of truth, introduced in his Abrams opinion,
Holmes justified on the ground that such a non-authoritative, nondogmatic, dynamic conception of truth "is the only ground upon which
[people's] wishes safely can be carried out." 2 0 He developed a highly
speech-protective interpretation of the First Amendment because he
thought that few matters of social ordering are as important as overcoming
the human tendency to hold onto fixed beliefs long after they have outlived
their accuracy, cogency, or usefulness. He came to favor a robust right of
free speech not because he thought that controversial ideas do little harm,
but rather because he believed that provocative, heretical speech is
foundational to an energetic, dynamic, adaptive way of life.'21 We need to
keep that emphasis in mind when trying to appreciate how his theater
example helped Holmes to mark the bounds of the freedom of speech.
This understanding of his approach to the subject leads me to think that
the falsity, absence of a general idea, and audience vulnerability features of
his theater example were important to Holmes, more so than the fact that in
his example the harm is a completed reality rather than a prediction. Like
Mill, Holmes did not believe that all uses of words are presumptively
immune from legal regulation, only uses of words that play a part in the
evolution of general ideas. Like Mill, Holmes believed that many
instances of communication can be regulated on the basis of reasonable
predictions that the speech will lead to certain specific kinds of harm, but
that the nature of the harms and causal scenarios that can count for this
purpose must be carefully circumscribed lest they be invoked to impair the
Id. at 631.
120Id. at 630.
121 For an elaboration

of this reading of Holmes, see Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the
Marketplace ofldeas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1.

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

566

[39:535

supremely important good of freedom of thought, the "principle of the
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other."l 22
How then do Mill and Holmes differ in the way their famous examples
delimit the freedom of speech? To pursue this inquiry, I return to the two
instances of corn dealer criticism and the two cases of anti-abortion speech
that I discussed in conjunction with Mill.
Holmes would certainly have agreed with Mill that the principle of
freedom of speech has to protect the publication in a newspaper of the
opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, even under circumstances
of high social tension regarding the practices of corn dealers. This kind of
utterance states an opinion, articulates or at least implies reasons, and gives
audiences ample opportunity to decide whether to accept or reject the
speaker's view. In these respects, it bears no resemblance to the false
shout of "Fire!" in a theater.
Mill's on-site corn dealer example, with the audience characterized as
"an excited mob," would seem to be a textbook illustration of the kind of
speech that can be regulated under Holmes' clear-and-present danger test.
It is a weaker case for regulation than the theater example in that it
involves the expression of an opinion that cannot be proved false, could
conceivably be uttered by someone who wished only to make a political
point and not to cause immediate material harm,123 and can be assessed by
the audience more easily than can a warning of fire in the vicinity.
Nevertheless, even more so than Mill, Holmes gives great emphasis to the
time dimension,124 and the on-site corn dealer example shares with the
theater example the feature that any harm likely to follow from the speech
is likely to occur in a heartbeat. Easy case for Holmes, as it was for Mill.
You will recall that I maintain that Mill could, consistently with his
argument in On Liberty, justify punishing anti-abortion protestors for
including in their messages of moral condemnation the names, pictures,
and addresses of abortion providers. I take that to be an implication of
Mill's argument not so much because the addition of such information
increases the likelihood of harm ensuing from the publication but rather
because its inclusion both permits the imputation of foul intent and
changes the content of the message in a direction that diminishes the
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[N]ot free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we
hate.").
123 See TEN, supra note 19,
at 132.
124 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]ime has upset many
fighting faiths .. . leave the correction of evil counsels to time.").
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probability that it will serve as a contribution to ongoing open-ended moral
reflection. Holmes would have a similar reason, grounded in the lack of
speech value, to deny protection to such action-oriented signs at rallies and
website postings, although he would ask whether the speech in question
contributes to open-ended, albeit inevitably partisan, contestation to
establish moral hegemony rather than disinterested moral reflection. In
addition, he would have other reasons to consider the ill-intentioned
transmission of criminally-facilitative information not to be covered by his
influential justification for the freedom of speech.
The scope of communicative activities covered by Holmes' argument
is narrower than is true for Mill. Remember that Holmes cautions in
Abrams that he is speaking "only of expressions of opinion and
exhortations"'2 5 and then only "where private rights are not concerned."l 26
The main point of the theater example, in my judgment, is to identify an
instance of speech that by virtue of its subject matter, intention, and
function has nothing to do with the evolution of ideas; the example is
offered in the spirit of excluding certain verbal activities from the ambit of
First Amendment concern. Admittedly, the name-specific anti-abortion
protest is much more political and much more capable of engendering
debate than is the shout of "Fire!" but hardly more so than the posting
would be without the names and addresses. The addition of that
information brings the case closer to Holmes' action-oriented examples of
persuasion to murder and ordering a boycott,127 cases he says lie beyond
First Amendment protection, presumably in part because the factor of
individualized targeting in those examples brings private rights of personal
and economic security into play. Notice that in the theater example as well
the threat is to individual lives rather than collective goods such as national
security, conventional morality, cultural identity, or the state of public
knowledge. That distinction is central to Holmes' understanding of the
freedom of speech, which he took to be mainly a constraint on the
maladaptive use of state power to prop up political, moral, cultural, and
philosophical orthodoxies under the pretext of guarding against public
harms.
My belief that Holmes' argument is much more sensitive than Mill's to
the distinction between public and private harms has consequences also for
the question of whether sidewalk counselors have a right closely to
Id. at 631.
'1 Id. at 628.
127 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying
text.
12
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approach women whom they hope to persuade not to have abortions. As
explained above, Mill cannot recognize the "moral distress" that such an
encounter might cause, but he can count harms that go beyond moral
distress, such as fear of physical harassment and discomfort at having
one's personal space invaded without invitation, by a critic or even by a
supporter.128 Under his analysis in On Liberty, however, Mill must balance
against such harms the benefits to understanding and personal identity that
sometimes can follow from unbidden attempts to persuade face-to-face,
and he must accord such potential benefits considerable weight. This is
why I consider Hill v. Colorado to be a difficult case for a Millian.
As I read him, Holmes does not offer reasons to prevent political
majorities from regulating "private" speech, including speech between two
individuals that is intelligible only to them, even when it occurs in the
midst of a large gathering of protestors. Holmes' argument for the
freedom of speech is about the need for a never-ending competition of
ideas in a metaphorical "market" that is open to all. It is about the struggle
for dominance among contending views, the struggle to constitute the next
majority. His market requires high disputational energy and low barriers to
entry in order to generate the collective good of adaptation to changing
conditions. But the concern for individual integrity, engagement, and
improvement that drives Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is
missing from Holmes' account.129 Mill feared majorities and sought to
keep them at bay.130 Holmes adored them.'3 1 This difference has
implications for their treatment of private speech, and explains why
Holmes should be much more willing than Mill to permit the majority to
decide when one person's desire to be let alone takes priority over
another's desire to persuade, bear witness, or condemn. For Holmes, Hill
is an easy case in favor of allowing regulation; for Mill, it is anything but.
I have little doubt that persons as knowledgeable in these matters as I
am will disagree with many of the judgments I have reached regarding how
Mill and Holmes ought to resolve the cases I have discussed in light of the
commitments they make with their famous speech limiting examples. I do
believe, however, that my two most basic conclusions are demonstrably
sound, even though they run counter to the way the corn dealer and theater
See supra text accompanying note 87.
See Ten Cate, supranote 13, at 52-61.
130 See Berlin, supra note 45, at 193-94.
13 See Thomas C. Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O'FallonMemorialLecture on Law
and American Culture:Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 71 OR. L. REv. 521, 537-38
(1992).
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examples are commonly invoked in modem debates about the freedom of
speech. The first conclusion is that neither Mill nor Holmes employed his
example to claim that in principle speech can be regulated whenever it can
fairly be predicted to cause a substantial amount of harm. The second is
that neither Mill nor Holmes treated all or even most instances of speech as
comparable in the sense of being subject to a single unitary standard
specifying the type and level of harm that can justify regulation. Both of
these great thinkers were not just discerning but discriminating in how they
valued the opportunity to communicate, even as they shared the judgment
that some opportunities to communicate are valuable beyond measure, so
much so as to lie beyond the authority of society to regulate, whatever the
calculus of middle- or long-run harm.

